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Abstract
Online crowdsourcing provides a scalable and inexpensive means to collect knowledge (e.g. labels)
about various types of data items (e.g. text, audio, video). However, it is also known to result in
large variance in the quality of recorded responses which often cannot be directly used for train-
ing machine learning systems. To resolve this issue, a lot of work has been conducted to control
the response quality such that low-quality responses cannot adversely affect the performance of
the machine learning systems. Such work is referred to as the quality control for crowdsourcing.
Past quality control research can be divided into two major branches: quality control mechanism
design and statistical models. The first branch focuses on designing measures, thresholds, interfaces
and workflows for payment, gamification, question assignment and other mechanisms that influence
workers’ behaviour. The second branch focuses on developing statistical models to perform effective
aggregation of responses to infer correct responses. The two branches are connected as statistical
models (i) provide parameter estimates to support the measure and threshold calculation, and (ii)
encode modelling assumptions used to derive (theoretical) performance guarantees for the mech-
anisms. There are surveys regarding each branch but they lack technical details about the other
branch. Our survey is the first to bridge the two branches by providing technical details on how they
work together under frameworks that systematically unify crowdsourcing aspects modelled by both
of them to determine the response quality. We are also the first to provide taxonomies of quality
control papers based on the proposed frameworks. Finally, we specify the current limitations and
the corresponding future directions for the quality control research.
Keywords: Crowdsourcing, Quality control, Statistical modelling and inference, Mechanism
design
1. Introduction
With the advent of Web 2.0 functionality, users of the Web gained the ability to submit ques-
tions online and get answers from other users. Crowdsourcing provides a mechanism by which
submitted questions are distributed and solved by generally large and anonymous online crowds.
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When answering questions, the online crowds are characterized by different and variable motiva-
tion (e.g. being money-driven or enjoyment-driven), and different and varying degrees of expertise.
As a result, they exhibit more diverse and in general less accurate question-answering behaviour
as compared to in-house workers who are trained to work more professionally and specifically on
internal platforms for tasks of particular companies [1]. On the other hand, online crowds are more
readily accessible and usually less expensive than in-house workers [2, 3, 4].
Over the past decade, online human intelligence marketplaces have been thriving, providing
organized and billed crowdsourcing services to requesters all over the world. Online crowds are
registered with the marketplaces as crowd-workers who are autonomous and generally receive a
small payment, typically a few cents [5], for finishing each question. Two popular crowdsourcing
marketplaces are Amazon Merchanical Turk1 (AMT) and CrowdFlower2.
In recent years, AMT and CrowdFlower have become very successful in providing human intelli-
gence support to the machine learning and data mining communities. They allow the communities
to perform large-scale label collection for data items used to train all kinds of machine learning
systems such as learning-to-rank systems in Information Retrieval [6], machine translation systems
[7] and general supervised learning systems [8, 9, 10].
As these platforms continue to grow by attracting more label collection tasks, they allow people
with varied abilities and motivations to join them to share the labelling workloads. This results in a
deterioration in the quality of labels and varieties of cheating behaviour prevalent on the platforms
[11].
1.1. Crowdsourcing Quality Control
To deal with the above issues, quality control for crowdsourcing (QCC) is required by which the
influence of high-quality labels is guaranteed to outweigh that of low-quality ones.
Worker filtering is the main QCC method used by crowdsourcing platforms to deal with label
quality deterioration and cheating behaviour of crowd-workers. It removes two types of workers:
unqualified workers and low-performing workers. The unqualified workers are removed using a quiz
before a task commences. The quiz contains only control questions (for which the true answer is
known) and each worker must achieve a certain accuracy on the control questions to be admitted to
the task. The low-performing workers are removed from the worker pool during their participation
in the task using unseen control questions embedded amongst the target questions. The worker
filtering mechanism typically removes all the responses given by each low-performing crowd-worker.
Other qualified workers then have to redo all the questions answered by these workers. This results
in more budget and time consumption.
The wisdom of the crowd (WoC) [12] is an alternative to worker filtering that does not discard
any response from low-performing workers. It retains the influence of their correct responses and
tries to smooth out the influence of the incorrect ones. It centres on the observation that proper
aggregation of multiple answers given by different people to the same question is able to yield a
better answer. For example, websites, such as Rotten Tomatoes3, Netflix4 and Last.fm5, utilize
WoC methods (which aggregate reviews from their users) to provide summary reviews and overall
1https://www.mturk.com/
2https://www.crowdflower.com/
3https://www.rottentomatoes.com/
4https://www.netflix.com/
5https://www.last.fm/
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Table 1: A summary of current QCC surveys.
Survey Areas Details Pros Cons
Review of designs for tasks/ Diverse design problems Lack of technical details about
measures/interfaces that allow: and strategies related to how statistical methods are
[13] Mechanism - Assessment of response quality measuring and controlling used/integrated in the designs
[14] Design (e.g. by quiz, expert/peer review); response quality are covered for various crowdsourcing
[15] - Assurance of response quality with brief descriptions. applications.
(e.g. by worker filtering, selection
,training, team work)
Review of statistical models for Technical details about a Lack of design information on
QCC which estimate: variety of statistical models crowdsourcing applications.
[16] Statistical - Worker ability/expertise; are specified. They include
[17] Modelling - Question difficulty; model assumptions,variables Ignoring aspects other than
[18] Methods - Question true answer; parameter estimation, etc. worker and question which
- Response quality; also affect response quality:
- Context (in which workers
are situated, e.g. time, location);
- Answer options
(their semantic relationships).
recommendation scores about their items. These summary reviews and scores have turned out to
be very accurate in depicting the underlying quality of the items.
The efficacy of the WoC approach relies on two crucial aspects. The first aspect is the redundancy
of the responses to the same question. Since one crowd-worker is usually not capable of consistently
providing the correct answer, naturally more workers are needed to work on the same question. The
second aspect is the aggregation of the redundant responses for eliciting an accurate final answer.
Two prerequisites need to be satisfied for the aggregation to work properly. First, the majority of
the crowd are reliable in deriving their answers. Second, there are sufficient responses collected for
each question. The WoC aggregation and the worker filtering can be applied together. The filtering
is typically applied prior to or during the crowdsourcing, while the WoC aggregation is typically
applied during or after the crowdsourcing.
The simplest WoC approach is the majority vote (MV). It considers the correct answer to a ques-
tion to be the one endorsed by the majority of the crowd-workers. It assumes that each response
is independent to one another and has the same quality irrespective of workers’ abilities. Conse-
quently, its performance is usually limited, especially when responses collected for each question
are scarce.
1.2. Statistical Models for Quality Control
Crowdsourced responses are fundamentally not independent and vary in quality. The former
suggests that the quality of a response can be indicated by the quality of other responses to which
it is related (e.g. by coming from the same crowd-worker). The latter implies that responses with
higher quality should be modelled to have greater influence in the WoC aggregation and vice-versa.
Statistical models provide a means of encoding the dependency of response quality on relevant
aspects of crowdsourcing (e.g. crowd-workers who gave the responses). Inference procedures can
be applied to these models to estimate the response quality and important attributes (e.g. worker
ability/expertise) of its dependent aspects. Aggregation for obtaining the correct response to each
question is also carried out by the inference procedures.
1.3. Quality Control Mechanism Design
A quality control mechanism is a program which runs to (reactively or proactively) control
modules of a crowdsourcing task which interact with crowd-workers to improve their performance.
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Figure 1: A diagram that shows a quality control process for crowdsourcing and its different parts reviewed by quality
control design and statistical modelling surveys. There however lacks a current survey that links the statistical models
with the designs.
The design of such a mechanism specifies how the control is conducted. For instance, a payment
(and bonus) module is common to crowdsourcing tasks. In this case, a payment mechanism can be
designed to manipulate this module on the time and amount workers get rewarded such that they
are constantly motivated to do their best.
Quality control mechanisms are usually based on statistical models which provide various esti-
mates designed to trigger and direct the mechanisms’ control of the task modules. For example, in
payment mechanism designs, the ability estimate for a worker can be used to determine whether
she needs to be rewarded or not. In addition, the modelling assumptions can also be used to derive
theoretical guarantees for the mechanisms that they inspire desirable worker behaviour (e.g. being
honest in their responses). We will discuss these in details later in the survey.
1.4. Related Surveys
A variety of surveys in the area of crowdsourcing have been published in the past. The sub-
jects of these reviews include general overviews of crowdsourcing [19, 20], management of certain
components of crowdsourcing platforms, such as the routing and recommendation of tasks [21, 22],
and different applications of crowdsourcing, such as information retrieval [23], software engineering
[24], data mining [25], health and medicine [26], music [27] and neogeography [28].
With the development of sophisticated quality control mechanisms in recent years, surveys
specifically regarding QCC research have started to appear. Existing surveys on quality control for
crowdsourcing mainly fall into two areas: quality control mechanism design and statistical (mod-
elling) methods, which is summarized in Table 1.2.
Current design surveys [13, 14, 15] mainly review general-purpose design strategies for building
QCC mechanisms, response quality measures and user interfaces deployed on various task modules.
As shown in Fig. 1, their main weakness is that they barely provide any technical details about the
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statistical methods (and vice versa) which provide the designs with various estimates, and how the
designs utilize these estimates to achieve their goals.
Current statistical modelling surveys [16, 17, 18] focus on the models and inference procedures
that learn attributes of two crowdsourcing aspects: the crowd-worker and the question. Table 1.2
shows their attributes reviewed by these surveys, namely: worker ability/expertise, question dif-
ficulty and true answer probability. There are other worker and question attributes that might
affect or indicate response quality. For example, worker effort and honesty are attributes that have
been frequently modelled by game-theoretic methods used for incentive designs [29, 30]. Questions
that might contain more than one correct answers (thereby suggesting subjectivity) have also been
studied and modelled in [31]. Current surveys however ignore quality control methods that model
and learn these attributes.
Apart from workers and questions, there are other aspects in crowdsourcing that also affect or
indicate response quality. The context in which each worker is situated is such an aspect. It is
characterized by the time, location, labelling device, pay rate, Web-page, etc. It has been modelled
and learned for quality control purposes in [32, 33, 34].
Another aspect is the response options from which workers choose to answer questions. When
the set of options is finite and large, their semantic relationships might become very useful for
indicating the responses according to recent QCC research [35, 36, 37]. Our survey reviews all the
QCC research that deals with these aspects.
1.5. Contributions
In this work, we overcome the weaknesses of current QCC surveys with following contributions:
• A unified taxonomy of the key aspects of crowdsourcing considered by the QCC research to
determine the response quality, along with their important attributes.
• A graph framework of all the QCC research in which the nodes represent the crowdsourcing
aspects and their attributes considered by the research. The graph contains paths indicating
different lines of research.
• A systematic review of all the QCC research based on the graph. The review starts from the
most basic work, which considered only the crowd-worker ability, and finishes with the most
sophisticated work, which considered multiple aspects and attributes.
• Hierarchical categorization of QCC papers. The hierarchies are constructed according to
features of the papers (e.g. considered aspects, modelling assumptions, parameter estimation
techniques, design features, etc.).
• An in-depth discussion of the QCC research and identification of current research limitations
along with the proposal of future research directions.
2. Crowdsourcing Aspects
The QCC research makes (explicit or implicit) assumptions on how quality of responses is
correlated with certain aspects of crowdsourcing. It proposes to encode these assumptions into
quality control mechanisms and statistical models to effectively control the response quality. To
conduct a systematic review on this research, we start by specifying four prominent aspects of
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Crowdsourcing
Aspects
Context
Response-
level
Context
Response features
e.g. duration
and location,
pay rate and bonus,
response order, etc.
Session/Page-
level
Context
Session features
e.g. duration
and location,
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number of questions
(in a session), etc.
Task-level
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(such as relevance
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age annotation),
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Figure 2: Aspects of crowdsourcing considered by the QCC research. Each ellipse node denotes a particular crowd-
sourcing aspect. Question and context have finer definitions at level 2. Rectangle nodes denote attributes of aspects
exploited by the QCC methods.
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crowdsourcing it has considered. These aspects (along with their key attributes) are shown in
Fig. 2.
Items/Questions. A question is the smallest unit in a crowdsourcing task. It is objective when it
has a single correct answer. It is purely subjective when every answer is correct (e.g. a demographic
question). In between lies partially subjective questions. Intuitively speaking, it has multiple
correct answers but at least one incorrect answer. For instance, consider the task to judge if an
image contains a person wearing fashionable clothes or not [38, 39]. Workers can disagree on what
the correct answers are for an image that contains a clothes-wearing person as they have different
preferences for fashion styles. Nonetheless, they should agree on what the wrong answer is for that
image (i.e. no person in it).
Both objective and partially subjective questions possess certain degrees of difficulty which
obscure their correct answers from crowd-workers to various extents. A difficult question leads to
variation in the responses across crowd-workers. For extremely difficult questions, workers may
have to resort to random guessing.
Crowd-workers. A worker has certain motivation for answering the questions, and a certain
level of (domain) expertise required by the subject of a task. The motivation governs the levels
of effort exerted by the worker to answer each question, and also the truthfulness of the worker’s
responses. When two workers possess the same level of expertise (in the same domain), the one
motivated to exert more effort is more likely to yield high-quality responses. The truthfulness of
the worker’s response determines how likely she responds with the answer she believes to be correct
(for a question). If the worker is malicious, she is more likely to give a different response.
When encountering a partially subjective question (e.g. judging whether an item is fashion-
related or not), a worker would exhibit preferences for certain features of the item (e.g. vintage
design and fabrics). Such preferences are independent from the ability of the worker, thereby having
no effect on the correctness of a response.
Response options. It is possible for a crowdsourcing task to have a large (but finite) set of
response options for its questions. A typical example is the crowdsourcing for the ImageNet database
[40] which stores millions of images according to tens of thousands of categories that are connected
in a semantic relational graph. In this case, the semantic relationships between these categories (as
response options) would influence the workers’ responses. For instance, consider the classification
task of 120 dog breeds from the ImageNet [41]. A worker is more likely to confuse the correct breed
(e.g. golden retriever) with a breed that is more related to it (e.g. Labrador) than with a less
related one (e.g. Chihuahua).
Contexts. A context in crowdsourcing is an environment in which crowd-workers are situated.
Changing or intervening in the context can affect the motivation of workers which further affects
the quality of their responses. From the literature, we found that different QCC methods control
the context at different levels of granularity. We thus propose to refine the definition of the context
according to the following three levels:
• Task level: a task-level context is characterized by features which distinguish multiple tasks on
the same crowdsourcing platform. These features contain information about individual tasks
such as the task durations, locations, domains, settings including the pay rates, instructions,
minimum accuracy for quizzes and so on. They also contain information about the responses
from workers who took multiple tasks such as micro-averaged and macro-averaged worker
response time for each task.
• Session level: a session-level context within a task corresponds to a question page of the task
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Figure 3: A graph framework of the past QCC research.
that a worker has completed and submitted. We call the process of the worker answering
all the questions on that page a working session of that worker. A session-level context
can thus be described by features regarding a task page (e.g. the pay rate for answering each
question on the page, their topics and total word counts, etc.). They also concern the worker’s
responses within a working session (e.g. the average response time on each question, the total
response time, the device used for the response, etc.).
• Response level: a response-level context represents an even finer level of granularity for the
within-task contexts. It corresponds to a single response given by a worker to a question,
and is described by features regarding this response (e.g. its payment, duration, location and
position in the sequence of all the responses given by the same worker).
3. A Graph Framework of the QCC Research
This survey is organized according to the graph shown in Fig. 3. This graph captures the
crowdsourcing aspects, their key attributes and the past QCC research that has considered them
jointly for developing control mechanisms and statistical models. The root node “Quality Control”
has outgoing edges to the four major crowdsourcing aspects specified in Fig. 2. Nodes at the
second level correspond to pairs of attributes which have been jointly considered by some of the
QCC research. Likewise, each node at the third level involves a triplet of attributes. Research
considering the triplets of attributes is usually the most sophisticated in terms of the assumptions
made.
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Labels on the edges describe the methods developed by the QCC research that exploited the
aspects. For example, gamification, payment, question allocation, and training mechanisms all make
use of the worker context to control response quality. Edges labeled “Statistical Methods”, indicate
that the corresponding research focuses on statistical modelling and inference of the attributes.
A path in the graph denotes a line of research. For example, the path from node “Context” to
node “Expertise-Difficulty-Context” denote the line of research that designed question allocation
mechanisms by considering more aspects (i.e. worker expertise and question difficulty).
Edges merging at a node indicate the combination of the corresponding QCC methods. For
instance, the edges merging at node “Motivation-Context” indicate that the research considering
worker motivation and contexts combines mechanism designs with statistical methods.
We carry out the rest of the survey according to the proposed graph. Each section corresponds
to a node in the graph and the QCC methods reviewed in the section are given by the labels.
4. Modelling Worker Ability
Modelling the effect that individual crowd-workers have on the quality of responses (QoR)
is most widely adopted by the QCC research. The effect is assumed to be determined by the
ability/expertise of each worker.
4.1. The Dawid & Skene Model
The work that first introduced a model for estimating worker ability was that of Dawid & Skene
[42], which we refer to as the DS model. It deals with the scenario where a worker i reads a question
j which has underlying true answer lj , and then gives her response rij to the question. Both the true
answer lj and the response rij are members of a finite set of options K which is the same for each
question. In this work, the crowd-worker i is modelled by a |K| × |K| confusion matrix Πi where
|K| is the size of the option set K. Each diagonal entry of the matrix piikk records the probability
of a response from worker i being correct: piikk = P (rij = k|lj = k), k ∈ K. Each off-diagonal entry
piikk′ records the probability of the response being incorrect: piikk′ = P (rij = k
′|lj = k), k 6= k′.
Since the k-th row of the confusion matrix stores conditional probabilities, the entries must sum to
one
∑
k′∈K piikk′ = 1.
The DS model adopts the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to perform maximum
likelihood (ML) estimation over all the worker responses. The ML estimation finds the locally
optimal estimates for the model parameters: both the probabilities in the worker-specific confusion
matrices and the true answers for the questions. In this case, the aggregation for inferring the true
answers is essentially integrated into the EM estimation process.
The EM algorithm comprises two alternate steps which are iterated until the convergence of the
likelihood. In the E-step, for each question j, the DS model estimates the probability of the true
answer lj being equal to each category k ∈ K given the current estimates pˆiik for the entries in the
k-th row of the confusion matrix Πˆi as:
ρˆjk = P (lˆj = k|Rj , {pˆiik}i∈Ij ,k∈K) =
∏
i∈Ij
∏
k′∈K
(pˆiikk′)
1{rij=k′}P (lˆj = k)∑
m∈K
∏
i∈Ij
∏
k′∈K
(pˆiimk′)1{rij=k
′}P (lˆj = m)
(1)
In Eq. 1, lˆj is the estimate of the correct answer lj ; ρˆjk is the estimate of the probability ρjk of
the correct answer lj = k; P (lˆj = k) is the estimate of the prior probability of lj = k; Ij = {i|(i ∈
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Figure 4: A taxonomy of QCC papers that only considered worker ability/expertise to determine response quality.
They focused on statistical modelling and inference.
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I)∧ (rij 6=?)} is the set of workers who have answered the question j, with “?” denoting a missing
value; Rj = {rij |i ∈ Ij} are their responses; 1{...} is the indicator function. In the M-step, the
algorithm estimates the rest of its parameters given the current estimates {ρˆjk}k∈K:
pˆiikk′ =
∑
j∈Ji
ρˆjk1{rij = k}∑
k′∈K
∑
j∈Ji
ρˆjk′1{rij = k′} (2)
P (lˆj = k) =
1
|J |
∑
j∈J
ρˆjk (3)
In Eq. 2, Ji = {j|(j ∈ J ) ∧ (rij 6=?)} is the set of questions answered by worker i. In Eq. 3, |J | is
the total number of questions.
There has been simplification in some of the subsequent work to only consider binary response
options. This means the confusion matrix specific to each worker is reduced to only two free
parameters (i.e. the diagonal entries). Such a simplified model is called a two-coin DS model [70].
If the two diagonal entries in this model are assumed equal (i.e. the error probability is independent
of the true answer), the model is further simplified into a one-coin model [45].
4.2. Improvements on Parameter Estimation
As an improvement on the maximum likelihood EM estimation for the DS model, Snow et
al. [43] employed MAP estimation for the parameters. Later, Tang and Lease [44] leveraged control
questions for improving the ML estimation. This was achieved via semi-supervised learning based
on the true answers of the control questions to refine the parameter estimation for the DS model.
Zhang et al. [45, 46] proposed to use spectral methods to initialize the EM algorithm to escape
local optimum in the search for the optimal true answer probability estimates and confusion matrix
estimates. Gao and Zhou [47] modified the M-step of the EM algorithm using a projection strategy
which acts as an alternative to prior distributions over worker abilities to prevent EM estimation
from over-fitting. The authors also customised the initialization procedures for the projected EM
to avoid local optimum.
Instead of point estimation based on EM, Kim and Ghahramani [49] and Carpenter [48] applied
their respective Bayesian treatments for building hierarchical DS models and used Gibbs sampling to
infer posterior distributions for the models’ parameters. Preserving the same Bayesian hierarchical
frameworks, Simpson et al. [50] applied variational Bayesian inference to efficiently estimate the joint
probabilities of the worker confusion matrices and the question true answers. The authors further
extended the frameworks with dynamic worker confusion matrices and adapted the variational lower
bound accordingly.
Ghosh et al. [51] proposed a spectral algorithm that decomposes a question-question matrix cap-
turing response correlations across questions to learn workers’ abilities and questions’ true answers.
The algorithm works with the one-coin DS formulation and requires the existence of one expert
worker and that every worker answers every question. Removing the last two constraints, Dalvi
et al. [53] proposed spectral methods that focus on decomposing worker-worker matrices capturing
response correlations across workers. Karger et al. [52] proposed to apply spectral decomposition
explicitly to the worker-question response matrix. Recently, Bonald and Combes [58] factorized the
response covariance matrix into one-coin worker abilities and developed a non-iterative algorithm
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that allows for real-time ability estimation. The algorithm leverages the current most informative
pair of workers with the highest covariance and their respective covariance with a target worker to
estimate the target worker’s current ability.
Karger et al. [54, 55] combined the previous spectral analysis with belief propagation algorithms
which achieved nearer optimality for true answer estimation. Liu et al. [56] applied full belief
propagation (BP) to both one-coin and two-coin DS models. They found that the efficacy of BP
depends heavily on the choice of prior distributions over worker ability variables. In comparison,
Ok et al. [57] proposed a practical belief propagation algorithm which works on the one-coin DS
model and does not rely on choice of prior distributions over worker abilities.
4.3. Dealing with Sparsity in DS
The main drawback of the DS model is its vulnerability to sparsity in the responses from workers.
When the number of responses per worker is small, the confusion matrix for each worker cannot
be estimated reliably. If the number of response options is also large, each confusion matrix will
be massive (quadratic in the number of response options), and estimating each matrix will most
certainly result in overfitting to the sparse responses. To solve this problem, the sparse response
information from individual workers needs to be combined and smoothed so that the overall response
information is sufficient for reliable estimation of each confusion matrix.
Venanzi et al. [59] applied Bayesian hierarchical modelling to infer clusters of workers, called
“communities”. The model allows for combining noisy response information across workers, such
that the confusion matrix for each worker is smoothed based on the cluster to which the worker
belongs. The model is parametric in the sense that it requires users to set up the number of
communities in advance.
In [60], the authors proposed both the Bayesian non-parametric modelling alternative and its
hierarchical extension to enable more flexible partitioning of the workers into communities. The
number of clusters is learned jointly with the confusion matrices for the communities and the
individual workers.
Instead of determining a number of worker communities, Liu and Wang [61] and Kamar et
al. [62] have developed statistical models for an extreme case where the individual worker matrices
is merged to form a single confusion matrix specific to the entire worker population. This confusion
matrix is then balanced against the confusion matrix for each worker to smooth out its noisy
information.
4.4. Theoretical Bounds on Error-Rate of DS Estimation Techniques
A line of work has investigated bounds on the error (convergence) rates of various parameter
estimation algorithms employed for learning the DS model as the redundancy of responses increases.
Among them, Ghosh et al. [51] first derived the upper bound for the error rate of a spectral inference
method for true answer prediction. The technique considered binary responses under the one-coin
DS model and assumed that each crowd-worker has answered a large number of questions. With
the same setting, Gao and Zhou [47] showed the global maximum likelihood estimator follows a
minimax lower bound with respect to the error rate, and their projected EM algorithm theoretically
can achieve nearly that rate.
Changing the setting by allowing each worker to answer just a few (rather than many) questions,
Zhang et al. [45, 46] proved their proposed EM with spectral method initialization yielded a tighter
upper bound than that of [51] and was faster to achieve the minimax error rate than [47]. Later,
Bonald and Combes [58] showed that their non-iterative algorithm can match an even stricter
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lower bound on the minimax error rate than the previous work. Karger et al. [52] proved that
when each worker provides only a few responses, their proposed framework based on low-rank
spectral decomposition yielded a strict upper bound on the error rate. Meanwhile, they proved
the framework matched a lower bound on the minimax error rate that could only be achieved by
the best possible question assignment with an optimal true answer inference algorithm. Later,
they [54, 55] showed their framework based on belief propagation methods yields a tighter upper
bound than [52] and the same lower bound on the minimax error rate. The same strict upper
bound was also achieved by the framework based on spectral methods proposed in [53]. In [57],
the authors proved that their framework based on belief propagation is able to achieve the tightest
possible error-rate lower bound under the same setting with an additional requirement that each
worker is assigned at most two questions. Recently, Gao et al. [71] established both the lower and
the upper bounds of the error rates that match exactly the exponential rates under the setting
in [54, 55].
Despite their theoretical soundness and empirical feasibility, current work in QCC error rate
analysis has seldom relaxed the binary-response assumption and the one-coin DS modelling as-
sumption. For works relaxing the binary-response assumption, we have only found that of [72]
whose inference framework adopted the same setting as [54, 55] but extended the binary response
options to multiple response options. They proved that a tight upper bound on the error rate can
still be reached using proposed spectral methods. For works relaxing the one-coin DS assumption,
we have only found that Liu et al. [56] imposed a two-coin DS model and has done empirical error
rate analysis based on belief propagation, EM and a mean field method with the conclusion that all
of them can achieve nearly optimal rates with proper prior settings on worker confusion matrices.
Despite these limitations, the current results of the QCC error rate analysis provide insights into
setting up both the early stopping criteria and the response redundancy requirement for crowd-
sourcing provided that certain parameter estimation methods are used for true answer estimation.
4.5. Non-Probabilistic Worker-Ability Models
A number of quality control methods that are not based on probabilistic inference have also
been developed. In these methods, the abilities of crowd-workers and the quality of their answers
are modelled to mutually support one another. The more workers who give the same response
to a question, the higher the quality of that response will be. Likewise, the more high-quality
responses provided by a worker, the higher the ability of this worker. The above mutually supportive
relationship is analogous to the authority-hub relationship modelled by the HITS framework [73].
In this case, the inference of the worker ability and the quality of responses has been conducted
in similar ways to HITS in [63, 64, 65, 66]. Inferring a true answer is done by aggregating all the
responses to a question weighed by the responses’ respective quality estimates. Alternatively, the
weights can be the difference between each response and the true answer estimate [63].
4.6. Truth-Discovery Worker-Ability Models
Research on truth discovery from different (possibly unreliable) information sources [67] shares
similar modelling characteristics to the QCC methods. Each source of information (equivalently a
crowd-worker) is associated with a reliability variable, called a weight, which measures the quality
of the claim (i.e. a response) made by the source about an object (i.e. a data item). The general
goal in truth discovery modelling is to minimize the sum of the weighted distance between each
claim and the latent ground-truth of the corresponding object. This distance function can be any
loss function depending on the data type of the claims and the ground truths. For example, the
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claims and the ground-truths can be observed as real-valued feature vectors, which do not often
occur in QCC modelling, and their distances can be measured as the squared or absolute difference
between these vectors. In comparison, QCC models mainly focus on minimizing the log-loss during
the learning process. A comprehensive review on truth discovery models was provided by [67].
Thus, the details of these models will not be covered in our survey. A few QCC methods have
adopted the idea of distances in truth discovery when handling tasks over ordinal or continuous
responses such as object counting [69], and percentage annotation [68].
5. Modelling Worker Expertise and Question Difficulty
More sophisticated QCC methods consider not only the worker ability but also the question
difficulty. The assumption is that some questions are intrinsically more difficult than others and
thus are expected to receive less reliable responses.
5.1. The GLAD Model
Based on the above assumption, some QCC models have taken the question difficulty into
account alongside the worker expertise for estimating the quality of each response [74, 78, 75, 79].
They model the quality of a response as the probability of it being correct. The most fundamental
work in this area is the GLAD model, in which a logistic function δij is used to represent the
probability that response rij is correct:
δij = P (rij = lj |ei, dj) = 1
1 + exp(−ei/ exp(dj)) (4)
where ei is a real-valued parameters that models the ability/expertise of the worker i, and (also
real-valued) dj models the difficulty of the question j. The exponent transformation exp(dj) serves
to prevent negative difficulty. Compared to the DS model which considers the bias of a worker
towards certain (possibly incorrect) responses, GLAD only models the probability of the correct
response and ignores any biases by assuming their corresponding probabilities to be uniform as
δij
|K|−1 . Here, |K| − 1 is the number of incorrect responses.
Like the DS model, the GLAD model also adopts the EM algorithm for parameter estimation.
More specifically, in the E-step, for each question j, the GLAD model estimates the probability of
the true answer lj = k as:
ρˆjk = P (lˆj = k|Rj , {eˆi}i∈Ij , dˆj) =
∏
i∈Ij
δ
1{rij=k}
ij
1−δij
|K|−1
1{rij 6=k}
P (lˆj = k)∑
k′∈K
∏
i∈Ij
δ
1{rij=k′}
ij
1−δij
|K|−1
1{rij 6=k′}
P (lˆj = k′)
(5)
In the M-step, the expected joint likelihood over the observed responses and unobserved true answers
with respect to ρˆjk is maximized over the rest of the parameters. The expected joint likelihood Q
is formulated as follows in GLAD:
Q({ei}i∈I , {dj}j∈J ; R, {lˆj}j∈J ) =∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
ρˆjk log
(
P (lˆj = k)
)
+
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈Ij
∑
k∈K
ρˆjk log
(
δ
1{rij=k}
ij
1− δij
|K| − 1
1{rij 6=k})
where R is the set of all the responses. The sets of expertise {ei}i∈I and difficulty {dj}j∈J are
estimated using gradient descent by taking partial derivatives of Q with respect to each element.
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Figure 5: A taxonomy of QCC papers that considered both worker expertise and question difficulty to explain
response quality. They focused on statistical modelling and inference.
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5.2. Improvements on Parameter Estimation
Many later QCC methods have followed the main idea in GLAD [74]: the quality of a response
being a probabilistic function over variables representing the worker ability and the question dif-
ficulty. In [75], the probit model is used where the logistic function is replaced by the Gaussian
cumulative function with the mean being the expertise ei minus a question-specific bias term, and
the variance being the difficulty dj . Additionally, instead of using the EM algorithm for the ML
estimation, this work employs approximate message passing inference on the model parameters.
Zhou et al. [76] used a minimax entropy model to estimate the accuracy of each response.
The entropy function is evaluated over all the responses with respect to their probabilities. The
ability of worker i and the difficulty of question j are introduced as Lagrangian multipliers for the
constraints derived from the i-th row and the j-th column of the response matrix. The authors
maximized the constrained entropy function with respect to the response probabilities P (rij = k),
and the ability and difficulty multipliers. Then, the constrained maximization was minimized with
respect to the latent true answer of each question, which was shown by the authors to be equivalent
to minimizing the KL-divergence between the probability estimates of the true answers and their
underlying distribution. Later, Zhou et al. [77] extended their original work by regularizing the
minimax optimization with relaxed constraints to prevent its response probability estimates from
overfitting sparse responses.
5.3. Multi-dimensional Worker Expertise and Side Information
More recent work has extended the worker-question interaction to be multi-dimensional. They
argue that workers can have their own areas of expertise and questions can be associated with the
different areas. The authors of GLAD exploited this idea by simply converting the worker expertise
and the question difficulty into vectors. Correspondingly, they converted the original scalar product
into a dot product between these vectors in [78, 79].
Ruvolo et al. [78] was also the first work to leverage side information of both crowd-workers (i.e.
their demographics) and questions (i.e. the features of the data items) for further improving the
parameter estimation. It incorporates the side information into the multi-dimensional GLAD model
as the design matrices for the linear regressions that respectively determine the prior means of the
expertise and difficulty vectors. Similar work was done in [82] which used the Gaussian cumulative
function to represent the response quality with the mean being the dot product specified in [78]
minus a worker bias term.
In [83], rather than set up the dimension for the expertise and the difficulty vectors in advance as
the previous work did, the proposed method modelled the dimension and the selection of the under-
lying latent expertise and difficulty components of the vectors as a Bayesian non-parametric Indian
Buffet process [95]. This work applied Gibbs sampling to infer the model parameters including the
true answers.
In [80], convex optimization techniques were proposed for training worker-specific binary clas-
sifiers which took side information features about questions (indicating question difficulty) into
account. To allow for the multi-dimensionality of the question features, these classifiers are en-
dowed with weight (expertise) vectors in the following logistic function:
δij = P (rij = lj |wi,xj) = 1
1 + exp(wTi xj)
(6)
In Eq. 6, wi is the real-valued weight vector specific to worker i and xj is the real-valued feature
vector for question j. The weight vectors follow a Multivariate Gaussian and the maximum a
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posteriori (MAP) estimate of the mean vector serves as the weight vector of a base classifier to
estimate question true answers using Eq. 5.
In [81], the multi-dimensionality of the expertise was estimated in a topic-wise manner for
questions each associated with a text document. The difficulty of each question was modelled to
be independent from their topics as a single variable. The model used Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) [96] with a universal distribution of the topics across all the documents (assuming each
of them to be short). It draws the topic of a question from that distribution and selects the
corresponding topical expertise of each worker (from their topical expertise vectors) to calculate
the correctness probabilities of their responses.
In [84], the authors proposed to extend the GLAD model by incorporating various types of side
information to improve the parameter estimation when responses are scarce. The side information
features concern worker demographics, question content and contextual information such as devices
(e.g. PC, mobile phone), browsers, time periods of each session, time duration and orders of each
response and so on. The worker and question features are incorporated into the GLAD model as:
δij = P (rij = lj |ei, dj ,α,β,xi,xj) = 1
1 + exp
(− (ei +αTxi)/ exp(dj + βTxj)) (7)
The dot product αTxi forms expertise offsets across the workers with the global coefficients α
learned to bring the offsets of similar workers closer together. This helps to smooth the irregular
expertise estimates that result from the sparse responses across workers. This effect is also applied to
the dot product βTxj for calibrating the difficulty dj . The context features were further divided by
the authors into the session-level features and the response-level features. The session-level features
were incorporated into the expertise factor of the GLAD model same as the worker features but
with different global coefficients. The response-level features are incorporated as (δij + η
T
i xij)
where δij is derived from Eq. 7, ηi are worker-specific coefficients, and xij are the feature values
regarding response rij . The coefficients ηi form a local linear regression over the feature vectors of
all the responses made by worker i. Such local regressions addressed worker-specific biases that the
GLAD model failed to handle properly [82].
5.4. Neural Network Approaches
Deep Learning approaches [97] have become very popular over the last few years in Machine
Learning applications. Recently, Yin et al. [85] used variational autoencoders [98] to map responses
to each question into latent true answer distributions. The inputs and outputs of the autoencoders
are vectors corresponding to individual questions. Each vector is a concatenation of the one-hot
encoding of the response given by each worker to a question. Both the encoder and the decoder are
implemented as single-layer networks and the global weight vector for each layer accounts for the
biases across the workers towards different response options. In addition to the weight vectors, a
question-specific scalar term is incorporated at each layer to account for question difficulty. It does
this by scaling the layer outputs before fed into a softmax transformation.
Atarashi et al. [86] leveraged semi-supervised learning and variational autoencoders to facilitate
true answer inference. They used features of unlabelled items to help distinguish the true answers
from some (item-specific) latent factors, both of which are assumed to have generated the various
feature values of the labelled and the unlabelled items. Instead of using responses and true answers
as input-output pairs for the encoder part (as done by [85]), they used the labelled and unlabelled
item features as the inputs, and both true answers and latent factors as the outputs for the encoder
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part. The relationships between the responses and the true answers are captured using multi-class
logistic regression.
In [87], deep feedforward neural networks were trained at two consecutive stages. To train the
network at the first stage, accuracy of workers and difficulty of questions were estimated based
on degrees of response agreement. Then, the accuracy and difficulty estimates are segmented into
different levels (e.g. “low” and “high” levels of accuracy/difficulty). The inputs to the network
correspond to individual responses. Each input vector contains both the overall estimates of worker
accuracy and question difficulty and their estimates across the different levels. The outputs of
the network are the correctness probability estimates of individual responses. They are used to
construct inputs to the neural networks at the second stage. Each of these networks corresponds to
a response option. The input to the k-th network consists of the response probability of each worker.
The response probability equals the output from the first stage, i.e. the correctness probability
P (rij = lj), if workers’ responses are the particular option k. Otherwise, the probabilities equal
1−P (rij=lj)
|K|−1 . The output from this network is normalized as P (lj = k) for each question.
5.5. Dealing with Ordinal Response Data
In crowdsourcing, the response options are sometimes not categorical but rather ordinal (e.g.
the relevance level of a document to a query) or continuous (e.g. the count of an object in an
image). In this case, it is natural to measure the distance between each worker’s response and the
corresponding correct answer. This distance directly reflects the quality of the response, which can
be modelled by a Gaussian density function. In this function, the mean is set to be the latent true
answer, and the precision (i.e. the inverse of the Gaussian variance) typically is set to be the ratio
of worker expertise to question difficulty.
In [88], the above framework was followed by one extra treatment that was to use global incre-
mental intercepts of an ordinal regression to model the natural ordering existing in the responses
(e.g. no/medium/high relevance of documents to queries). In [99], the framework was further ex-
tended to be a worker-specific Gaussian mixture with each Gaussian component acting as a “soft”
intercept in the ordinal regression. This model deals with the situation where workers show their
individual biases towards different response options.
In [90] and their subsequent work [91, 92, 93], a slightly different framework was adopted where
each response is set to follow a Gaussian distribution with the mean being the dot product between
the latent variable vectors of each worker and the target question. The variance is always set to be
one. Sharing the same idea with [80], these methods estimate the true answer of each question using
the dot product between the question’s latent vector and the MAP estimate of the mean vector
over all the workers’ latent vectors. Zhou et al. [94] adapted the minimax entropy principle from
their previous work [76] to make it compatible with ordinal responses by modifying the constraints
to account for the natural ordering in the response options.
6. Modelling Worker Preferences and Question Subjectivity
In crowdsourcing, some tasks might contain partially subjective questions. These questions
possess more than one correct answer and at least one incorrect answer. To answer such a question
correctly, a worker needs to avoid any incorrect answers, which depends on her ability/expertise
and the difficulty of the question. Meanwhile, her subjective preferences/opinions on different
(subjective) features of the question will cause her to prefer one of the correct answer options over
the others.
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Figure 6: A taxonomy of QCC papers that considered worker preferences and question subjectivity. They focused
on statistical modelling and inference.
To the best of our knowledge, very few QCC methods have endeavoured to distinguish between
question difficulty and subjectivity in one unified model. In [100], the authors assumed that a
higher joint degree of difficulty and subjectivity for an entire task can increase the number of
underlying groupings of responses given to each question in the task, with the expected number
of responses in each group becoming smaller. The authors proposed to infer the response groups
using a Dirichlet Process Mixture Model [102]. Despite attributing the response variation to both
difficulty and subjectivity, the paper made no attempt to separately model the two even though
they might induce different types of interactions with workers.
In [101], the authors focused on ordinal ratings given to partially subjective items with observed
features. The rating rij is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution with the mean and the variance
linearly regressed on the observed features xj of item j as rij ∼ N (wTxj , exp(vTxj)). Here, w
and v are global coefficient vectors. The variance encodes the mixing effects of the subjectivity and
difficulty of the item. Thus, this method is also not intended to separate the modelling of the two
properties.
Recently, Yuan et al. [31] proposed the first QCC model that separates the difficulty and sub-
jectivity. It replaces the single truth variable lj for a question j with a subjective truth variable
lij specific to each response rij . The subjectivity of question j is captured by factorizing lij into
another latent variables that represent worker i’s preferences and the question’s features. The dif-
ficulty of the question is directly encoded as a variable dj which counteracts expertise ei in the
following logistic function:
δij = P (rij = lij |ei, dj) = 1
1 + exp(−(ei − dj)) (8)
To prevent the preference-feature factorization of lij from explaining all the response variation, the
authors further replaced the preference vector of each worker with much sparser topic-preference
vectors. These vectors are associated with each worker via an LDA. In this case, each worker has a
distribution over a finite set of interested topics. A topic is associated with a topic-preference vector
to be used in the preference-feature factorization for each lij via topic-response assignment. This
work is also the first to propose a measure of subjectivity in crowdsourcing which is the expected
number of correct answers with respect to underlying groups of workers. The worker groups were
clustered using K-means with the Elbow method over the topic distribution of each worker.
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which further influence worker effort and truthfulness, and eventually the correctness of responses.
7. Modelling Worker Motivation and Worker Contexts
Different incentive mechanisms are designed to favour different characteristics of worker mo-
tivation. According to [103], motivations can be broadly characterized as being either extrinsic,
which is the desire to gain monetary payoffs and avoid costs, or intrinsic, which is the desire to
achieve fulfilment and enjoyment. Correspondingly, we categorize the past literature on incentive
mechanisms into monetary payment and gamification approaches which are respectively responsible
of motivating the workers extrinsically and intrinsically.
7.1. Incentive Mechanisms Based on Monetary Payment
Monetary payments in crowdsourcing involve two types: base payments and bonus payments.
The extrinsic motivation of rational workers is to choose answer options that maximize their mon-
etary payoffs [123, 124, 125]. The payoffs are usually formulated as the difference between the
monetary rewards given to the workers for the responses they provide and the costs incurred (the
effort exerted) to generate these responses [117, 125]. Maximizing the payoffs means minimizing
the (costs of the) effort exerted. Consequently, one expects crowd-workers to minimize their effort,
which generally leads to a deterioration in the quality of their responses. Moreover, some workers
could even deliberately choose to not truthfully report the responses that they elicited with effort
(e.g. by flipping their responses) if they believe that doing so could result in higher payoffs [116].
To address the above issues, specialized incentive mechanisms have been devised that alter either
the fixed base payment or the fixed bonus payment, causing the payment to become adaptive at
the task level (or some lower levels of contexts). The aim of the adaptiveness is to ensure that the
expected payoffs of the workers are maximized only when they exert sufficient effort to produce
high-quality responses and report these responses truthfully.
7.2. Monetary Payment in Task-Level Contexts
In a task-level context, control questions are sometimes available and can be inserted randomly
into each question page (such that crowd-workers do not know their whereabouts). Once the workers
finish the task, the monetary payments to them can be adapted to be different (i.e. either the base
or bonus payments) based on their accuracy on the control questions. The accuracy of the responses
to those control questions serve as the inputs to some carefully designed payment function which
outputs a final reward for the worker and guarantees that this reward be maximized only when she
has exerted sufficient effort and reported all her answers truthfully.
In [104], the task allows workers to express their confidence in different response options as the
correct answer for each question. The confidence scores of a worker for all the control questions are
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then taken into account when estimating the worker’s accuracy. The accuracy estimate is then used
to calculate the payment to the worker. In [105], the task additionally provides a “skip” option for
each question and the final payment is decreased for each skipped control question and increased
(multiplicatively) for each correctly answered one. In later work [106], the authors proposed a two-
stage design where a worker first answers all questions, and then is provided with the opportunity
to change her answers after viewing a reference response from another worker to each of the same
questions. At both stages, the payment function evaluated over the worker’s responses to the control
questions ensures her truthful reporting.
7.3. Monetary Payment in Response-Level Contexts
Most state-of-the-art incentive mechanisms that are based on monetary payments were devel-
oped under the assumption that the control questions are unavailable in crowdsourcing tasks or too
scarce to be used reliably. Certain mechanisms were developed for making the payments adaptive
to the response-level context. This means that a worker is not paid the same amount for every
question and that different workers may be paid differently for their answers to the same question.
The aim is to make the payments dependent on the quality of the response, where a response of
higher quality deserves a higher base or bonus payment.
Since the quality of a response is unknown without control questions, the incentive mechanisms
in this case resort to a strategy called peer consistency to assess the quality of a worker’s response. In
this case, a response from another random worker, called a peer worker, is selected for comparison
with the target response. If these two responses are the same, then the target worker will be
rewarded according to a payment function that is carefully designed to induce a game-theoretic
equilibrium among all the workers [117, 108, 115, 116]. In such an equilibrium, no worker can
improve their expected payoff by acting differently from what is required by the mechanism, namely
that they truthfully report their answers to the data requester. Such an equilibrium is thus also
referred to as a truthful one.
The game-theoretic incentive mechanisms usually model the belief systems of crowd-workers,
which consist of their prior and posterior beliefs about the correct answers to questions. The belief
systems are assumed by these mechanisms to be either homogeneous, which means they are identical
across all workers, or heterogeneous, which means that different workers possess different prior and
posterior beliefs as well as different ways of updating the beliefs.
Output agreement [107] is the most basic peer consistency mechanism which does not assume
any form of belief system (i.e. neither specific distributions over correct answers nor whether the
distributions are shared) among workers. It only involves paying a worker for her response to a
question when the response is the same as the one given by a randomly selected peer to the same
question. Based on output agreement, Waggoner and Chen [108] assumed a homogeneous prior
belief across workers (i.e. a shared non-specific prior distribution over correct answers) and hetero-
geneous posterior beliefs (i.e. private non-specific distributions) according to workers’ individual
understanding after reading the question. They defined a broader payment function by replacing
the 0/1 error function in output agreement with the Euclidean distance between the response and
the peer’s response. They showed that output agreement based on this general payment scheme
at best results in a strict equilibrium where workers report the correct answer according to the
common part of their understanding.
Peer prediction [109] is another early work based on peer consistency assessment which assumes
homogeneity for prior beliefs and heterogeneity for posterior beliefs with specific distributions over
correct answers. It proposes to use the assumed posterior updated from observing a worker’s
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response together with a random peer’s response to the same question to calculate the reward for
the worker. In the original paper, the authors consider the case in which true answers and responses
are continuous and for which they assume the belief systems follow Normal distributions. In general,
conjugate distributions are usually selected for the belief systems to facilitate belief updates. A
drawback of the peer prediction approach is the existence of multiple undesired equilibria caused
by the collusion among workers. The collusion allows them to exert no effort (e.g. by copying each
others’ answers to every question) and yet gives them higher expected payoffs than the truthful
equilibrium does. Thus, subsequent work has focused on removing such equilibria [110, 111] or
designing payment functions that penalize the “collusion equilibria” to make them have smaller
payoffs than the truthful one [112]. However, the techniques still assume that true answers and
responses are binary.
Peer truth serum (PTS) [115] is an alternative when data requesters cannot find appropriate
distributional assumptions for the posterior beliefs of workers. This is because PTS does not
consider the posterior beliefs in the payment design. Instead, it assumes homogeneity for the
prior belief of workers about correct answers for which the requesters need to provide specific
distributions. PTS makes use of the assumed prior distributions and the 0/1 distance between the
target worker’s response and a random peer’s response to the same question to calculate the target’s
reward. Such a payment function was shown by the authors to induce at least one “non-truthful”
equilibrium where all workers collude with one another to always give the least likely responses
to each question. Instead of using a predefined prior distribution, subsequent work [116] focused
on dynamically estimating the prior using frequencies of responses from other workers to the same
question to which the response of the target worker was given.
Bayesian truth serum (BTS) [113] assumes homogeneous prior beliefs (i.e. a shared non-specific
prior distribution) for crowd-workers. On the other hand, it implies that the posterior beliefs
are heterogeneous by requiring additional assessments from workers about the probabilities over
correct answers to each question along with their responses. BTS obtains the geometric mean of
these probability estimates excluding the one from the target worker and combines it with the
frequencies of collected responses to calculate the payment for the target. A weakness of BTS is
that it needs a large number of workers to answer the same question in order to produce a reliable
geometric mean to achieve a truthful equilibrium. Robust BTS [114] was proposed which modified
the payment function of BTS to handle the situation where only a few workers answer each question.
Furthermore, a divergence-based BTS [126] has been proposed to handle continuous responses (e.g.
numbers). The payment function of this mechanism leverages the KL-divergence of the probability
estimates over intervals that might contain the correct answer between the target worker and a
random peer.
The work reviewed thus far focuses on modelling crowd-workers’ beliefs or distributions on
the correct answers of questions. This is different from non-incentive quality control models such
as DS and GLAD which focuses on modelling the response correctness or biases given a global
distribution over the correct answers. The former type of modelling emphasizes the elicitation of
honest responses (i.e. workers exert efforts and truthfully report what they think to be the correct
responses) which might turn out to be incorrect. The aggregation of these responses to obtain
better final answers can come afterwards using the DS or GLAD models.
There are other incentive mechanisms which directly model response biases of workers (as the
DS model does) for deriving payment functions that are able to achieve a truth-telling equilibrium.
Unlike the DS model, they do not explicitly infer question true answers but rather aim at eliciting
effort-exerted and honest responses. The first work in this regard was proposed by Dasgupta
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and Ghosh [117], referred to as the DG mechanism. They dealt with binary response options
based on the one-coin DS model. They model the efforts exerted by workers as binary variables
that control the switch between arbitrary guessing (i.e. zero-effort) and the workers’ response
correctness probabilities (i.e. effort-exerted) which were assumed to be always greater than 0.5.
The payment function was designed to both recognize the response agreement between the target
worker and a random peer for the same question, and penalize zero-effort (coincidence) agreement
given both workers’ response statistics calculated from the other questions. The authors proved
that this payment function avoided a zero-effort equilibrium by making it always less appealing
than a truthful equilibrium in terms of expected rewards over efforts and response correctness.
Based on the same one-coin model, Witkowski et al. [118] additionally considers the scenario
where a worker would make the decision on whether to participate in the crowdsourcing task.
The probability of participation equals the worker’s response correctness probability, which models
the worker’s self-assessment about their qualification. Correspondingly, the payment function is
designed in such a way that unmotivated or unqualified workers will prefer to not participate rather
than guess an answer (with zero effort), which also means that those who participate will be qualified
and invest efforts in the equilibrium.
Both Dasgupta [117] and Witkowski et al. [118] have assumed the cost induced by non-zero
efforts is a constant. Within the same modelling framework, Liu and Chen [119] proposed an
extension which considers varying unknown costs randomly drawn from a distribution under non-
zero efforts. Learning the cost distribution requires the workers to additionally report their costs
of answering each question. The learning process is integrated with an incentivizing process, which
aims to reach a truth-telling equilibrium, under a multi-armed bandit framework. The framework
optimizes the trade-off between the two processes. Another hybrid mechanism that combines the
DG mechanism with a multi-armed bandit framework to realize a similar goal was proposed in [120].
It learns the optimal choices of bonus levels at each time step for workers categorized into two peer
groups that cross validate the truthfulness of each other’s answer reporting behaviour.
Based on a two-coin DS model that captures workers’ biases in binary labelling, Liu and
Chen [121] leveraged binary labels generated by classification algorithms as the benchmark labels
against which worker responses were compared for peer consistency assessment. The assessment
results are then input to a payment function which guarantees that if the error rates of the clas-
sification algorithms on predicting the true labels converge towards zero, the function is able to
achieve a truthful equilibrium.
The above mechanisms have more-or-less coped with undesirable equilibria, which yield higher
expected payoffs than the truthful ones do, in their theoretical formulation of the payment functions.
However, empirical evidence remains insufficient in the following two aspects [115, 122]. First, it is
still unclear that whether the existence of these undesirable equilibria actually pose a problem to the
quality of crowdsourced data in practice. Second, it remains to be seen whether these theoretically
elegant truth elicitation mechanisms based on peer consistency assessment can work effectively in
practice.
After any of the above incentive mechanisms is applied to the monetary payments for workers’
responses, quality control methods can be further applied to the crowdsourced responses to produce
more reliable estimates of the true answers. There are also unified frameworks proposed by Frongillo
et al. [29] and Ho et al. [30] that integrate the above process. More specifically, Frongillo et al. [29]
combined a payment function that ensures a truth-telling equilibrium with the Bayesian statistics to
allow for both truthful response elicitation and Bayesian aggregation for inferring the true answers.
In [30], a further step was taken to optimize the multiple-choice interface with confidence shown to
24
each worker (the interface being similar to the one employed in [104]) along with the optimization
of the Bayesian aggregation.
7.4. Incentive Mechanisms Based on Gamification
Gamification refers to incorporating (video) game elements into various (levels of) contexts of
crowdsourcing tasks in an attempt to lift the intrinsic motivations of workers to make them more
engaged in answering questions. This eventually leads to improved quality of their responses. The
intrinsic motivations are crowd-workers’ feelings of enjoyment, playfulness, and accomplishment
(e.g. through improvement of their own skills), and the welfare of the communities. Different from
the payment-based incentive mechanisms discussed above which derive theoretical guarantees of
expected performance of crowd-workers, the gamified incentive mechanisms have proven themselves
empirically to have improved the quality of workers’ responses.
Statistical Method
Based Design:
Modelling Worker
Motivation &
Intervened Context
Gamification
Task-Level
Context
Leaderboard
Based on Scores
Competition
Monetary
Bonus Reward
[144]
[131, 132, 142, 140,
136, 143]
Session-Level
Context
Badge Reward
Based on Scores
Altruism [140]
Self-Fulfilment:
Knowledge & Skill
Advancement
Tutorials [139]
Quizzes [137]
Enjoyment
Enhancement
[133, 141, 142, 143]
Response-
Level Context
Score Reward
Based on Accu-
racy Estimation
Altruism [140]
Self-Fulfilment:
Knowledge & Skill
Advancement
Tutorials [139]
Quizzes [136, 137, 138]
Enjoyment
Enhancement
[127, 128, 129, 130,
131, 132, 133, 134, 135]
Figure 9: A taxonomy of QCC papers that considered the interaction between worker context and (intrinsic) moti-
vation. They focused on designing gamification mechanisms which, in most cases, rely on statistical estimation of
worker ability.
7.5. Gamification in Response-Level Contexts
Score feedback (aka “scoring”) is the most fundamental means of gamification that allocates
a certain number of points to a worker depending on the quality of her response. Higher-quality
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responses should be rewarded with more points. This makes the scoring very much similar to
dynamic monetary payments in terms of how they are allocated. They are however different with
regard to the types of motivation they deal with. The former provides virtual rewards for increasing
intrinsic motivations as opposed to material rewards provided by the latter for increasing extrinsic
motivations. In addition, scoring often acts as the building block of other more complicated game
elements such as leaderboards and level systems.
In [127], a simple and fun online game was developed to help train a face recognition system
to refine its classification. In the game, a crowd-worker was rewarded with certain points every
time she provided correct feedback regarding an uncertain recognition result from the system. The
experiments showed that the game, without paying any bonus, iteratively improved the recognition
performance of the system solely based on the enjoyment/fulfilment it brought the workers. The
incentivizing aspects of the above game design, including the graphics and the scoring mechanism,
made the game enjoyable for workers to engage in, causing them to provide more accurate answers
in general. Thus, these design aspects have appeared repeatedly in gamified crowdsourcing over
different areas including medical facts elicitation [128], relevance judgement in Information Retrieval
[129, 130, 131], image classification [131], video captioning [132], language translation [133], and
communication to the general public about culture [134] and science [135].
Apart from the enjoyment and increased productivity it has brought to crowdsourcing, the
scoring mechanism can also help to build more sophisticated incentive mechanisms that advance the
skills and knowledge of crowd-workers. Such advancement allows the workers to produce responses
of higher quality. A typical skill-development mechanism that has been boosted by the scoring
mechanism from gamified crowdsourcing is the online quiz. In [136], online quizzes were advertised
as skill/knowledge tests for individuals in order to attract both unpaid volunteers and crowd-
workers. These quizzes contain not only control questions but also target questions for which the
requesters were seeking correct answers from the participants. The scoring mechanism in this case
supported both the performance feedback mechanisms, which display each individual’s score and
the others’ average score, and the all-time leader-boards, which rank the participants by their
scores. The experiment results show that such quizzes can attract a large number of participants
with diverse skills over a relatively short period, and the total payment is much lower than what
would have been required by AMT.
The main idea of the above work to use gamified quizzes to attract participation of (and contri-
butions from) workers or volunteers who seek enjoyable learning experiences, has also been adopted
in [137] and [138]. The former work leveraged the idea for engaging employees in learning about
enterprise history, products and services while crowdsourcing some subjective data from them (e.g.
their opinions). The latter leveraged the intrinsic fun of quiz bowl [145] for engaging online players
to provide answers to questions as the labels to be used in training classifiers that can perform
better automatic question-answering.
Apart from quiz testing, tutorial training/learning is another means of stimulating workers’
intrinsic needs for knowledge and skills, and has been seamlessly combined with the scoring mecha-
nism. In [139], a gamified crowdsourcing platform for image editing was developed which attracted
large numbers of workers as they could learn skills for producing high-quality and creative images.
The basic game element employed by the platform was scoring, which again also supported an all-
time leaderboard. Worker satisfaction surveys were collected and showed that most of the workers
appreciated the sense of achievement created by the scores when learning the image editing skills.
Moreover, feedback from the requesters showed that the number of images with better quality was
almost double compared to those produced by the originally novice workers.
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Scoring mechanism can also help incentivize workers to make altruistic contributions to their
communities. In [140], the focus is on motivating workers to contribute to the construction of a
new online community. The scoring mechanism in this case quantifies the amount of contribution
a worker has made, and supports more advanced game elements including a badge system and an
all-time leaderboard.
7.6. Gamification in Session-Level Contexts
Badges are typical game elements that are awarded to people for recognizing their achievements
and contributions at different levels (usually with bronze, silver and gold badges corresponding to
the increasing levels). Many crowdsourcing marketplaces (e.g. CrowdFlower) have implemented
their own badge systems that award workers within task-level contexts according to the numbers
of tasks they have successfully completed. In a gamified task, badge awarding usually happens
in session-level contexts. More specifically, when a worker completes a session/page of questions,
she gains some points and whenever her total points exceed a certain threshold, a badge system is
triggered to award her with the corresponding badge. Such a badge system has been integrated into
the session-level contexts for various motivational purposes. They range from making laborious and
tedious work (such as image annotation [141], proofreading [142], language translation [133] and
mobile application testing [143]) more enjoyable, confirming one’s learning progress, (e.g. on image
editing [139] and enterprise knowledge [137]), to encouraging workers’ commitment to building
online communities [140].
7.7. Gamification in Task-Level Contexts
The most notable game element that has been utilized for gamifying task-level contexts in paid
crowdsourcing is the leaderboard. Typically, a leaderboard exists throughout the entire duration
of the task and is accessible by all the workers at any time in the task. The aim is to ignite
competition amongst the workers, which motivates them to work harder to either overtake those
above them in the ranking or to maintain their current rank positions. However, the past research on
using all-time leaderboards to incentivize workers has yielded conflicting empirical results. In [131],
steady improvements were observed in the quality of workers’ relevance judgements for documents
to search queries. Quality was measured in terms of the level of agreement between workers on
the same document-query pairs. In [142, 132], workers were required to do proofreading. Senior
workers were demotivated by the competition brought about by the presence of a leaderboard
while younger workers found it the other way round. In [140], workers constantly returned to the
communities as they would like to follow their status on the leaderboard, and were encouraged by
doing so to make more contributions, although their quality varied significantly. In [136], an all-
time leaderboard was set up which provided two types of ranking: the percentage of correct answers
and the total number of correct answers submitted. The leaderboard in both cases showed positive
effects on the quality of workers’ answers only in the early stages of the tasks as it discouraged
the workers who came late to the tasks when other workers had already amassed a large number
of points and had well-established positions on the leaderboard. A similar phenomenon has also
been observed in [143, 144]. In [143], new workers collected pro-environmental behaviour data for
a mobile application. Performance was initially high before dropping for later arriving workers
due to the large difference in the contribution points between the leading workers and themselves.
In [144], workers were exposed to a task leaderboard when performing relevance judgment [146].
The authors found that providing such a leaderboard could significantly improve the quality of
responses (compared to no leaderboard) only when the workers were informed of a top-10 bonus
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reward with one dollar per person. They also observed that considering the number of responses
made by each worker thus far in the rank calculation resulted in lower accuracy across workers (than
considering the percentage of correct responses). They argued that this indicated a discouraging
factor of the task leaderboard.
To deal with the above issue, Ipeirotis and Gabrilovich [136] suggested the leaderboard be
embedded in session-level contexts which means that there is a leaderboard dedicated to each page
of a task. In this case, workers need to answer correctly much fewer questions to reach the top
of a page leaderboard. As a result, workers who arrive late at a task page are less likely to be
intimidated by the (page) leaderboard rankings. In [140], the experiment results suggested that the
leaderboard should only be “switched on” after a certain “warming-up” period for each worker, by
which time she will have completed enough questions to make herself feel less disadvantaged by the
late starting point.
8. Modelling Worker Expertise and Contexts
Not only can the motivation of workers be affected by intervened contexts but also their
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Figure 10: A diagram shows training mechanisms control worker contexts to improve worker expertise, which further
improves the correctness their responses.
expertise can interact with the contexts in different ways. According to the QCC literature, we
have found the following two types of mechanisms in which the interaction takes place:
• Worker expertise is improved by training mechanisms deployed at different levels of contexts.
• Worker expertise is leveraged by question assignment mechanisms to control the allocation of
questions into different levels of worker contexts.
8.1. Improving Worker Expertise Using Training Mechanisms at Different Levels of Contexts
Training mechanisms intervene in the context to directly affect the expertise of workers. They
aim at improving workers’ expertise regardless of their motivation. By default, the training of
crowd-workers is performed prior to their participation in a task and aims to teach the workers
basic skills and expertise required to answer the questions in the task. It has been shown in [148]
that the default training can significantly improve the quality of worker responses on a variety of
crowdsourcing tasks. The mechanism is restricted however to a task-level context in which each
worker only receives the training once throughout the entire task. As a result, even when the
later performance of the workers is undesirable, they are not given a chance to be retrained to
perform better. To solve this issue, Bragg et al. [147] proposed a training mechanism functioning
in the session-level contexts. The mechanism models the decision-making process of whether to
train a worker or collect responses from her in each of her working sessions as a partially observable
Markov decision process (POMDP) [155]. It then employs reinforcement learning to estimate the
parameters of the POMDP including the expertise vectors of individual workers and the correct
answers to the questions.
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Figure 11: A taxonomy of QCC papers that considered the interaction between worker expertise and context. These
papers focus on designing either training mechanisms that alter contexts to improve worker expertise or question
allocation mechanisms that use worker expertise to determine questions to be answered in the contexts.
8.2. Question Allocation in Crowdsourcing
Reducing the number of responses collected using crowdsourcing to lower costs while maintaining
the prediction accuracy on question true answers has been an important QCC research topic over
the years. A common crowdsourcing process involves assigning each worker a set of questions
which is selected uniformly at random according to a value set up prior to the task by the data
requester for the number of questions answered per worker. Each worker answers the set of assigned
questions only once. Unfortunately, such a process often leads to a higher total (monetary) cost than
necessary. This is because the uniformly random assignment of the questions is independent of all
the informative characteristics of the workers (e.g. their domain expertise, interests, etc.) and the
questions (e.g. their domain difficulty, genres, etc.), and thus fails to leverage these characteristics
for more efficient performance. On the other hand, if the question assignment can be designed to
be biased towards these characteristics, then the question’s true answer prediction can potentially
be improved with lower costs.
8.3. Non-Adaptive Question Allocation Based on Worker Expertise in Task-Level Contexts
In this case, the allocation of questions happens before any worker enters the task. The total
number of allocated questions equals the batch size multiplied by the number of workers (if each
worker is assigned questions only once and never reused once they finish their batches). Once the
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task begins, workers arrive in sequence to pick up the corresponding allocated batches. Such pre-
task simultaneous allocation of questions relies on designing a bipartite graph which contains two
types of nodes: questions and workers, where edges between them correspond to the assignment of
a question to a worker. In [52, 54, 55], the authors proposed to draw a regular random bipartite
graph based on the configuration model from the random graph theory [156]. In the graph, the
degrees of the question and the worker nodes represent how many workers to assign to each question
and how many questions to assign to each worker respectively. The goal of their work is to realize
a particular error rate on true answer prediction with minimum costs (i.e. minimum degree for the
question nodes or equivalently, minimum number of responses6). The authors proved that using
a regular random graph to achieve a target error rate was sufficient. This graph’s actual error
rate was within a constant factor of the target rate using the underlying graph (which is possibly
neither regular nor random) with the best possible inference algorithm. The authors also showed
that the cost incurred by each binary question to achieve a target error is the error value scaled by
the inverse of the expectation of each worker’s expertise. In their following work [72], the authors
investigated the same subjects but with non-binary questions. They derived similar results in terms
of the near-optimality of the regular random graph in achieving any target error rate and the scaling
effect of expertise on the cost per question.
8.4. Adaptive Question Allocation Based on Worker Expertise in Response-Level Contexts
For the adaptive schemes, the question allocation happens within an ongoing task and is
dependent on the current estimate of each worker’s expertise based on their responses so far. Sheng
et al. [149] and Ipeirotis et al. [150] proposed to model one key aspect in the adaptive allocation,
that is the uncertainty of each question’s true answer. In their work based on the one-coin DS
model for binary questions, the uncertainty of a question depends on the expertise/ability of the
workers who answered it. The higher the expertise, the lower the uncertainty will become. The
authors simplified the scenario by assuming that all the workers shared the same level of expertise
and were non-adversarial (i.e. their response correctness probability always greater than 0.5). They
proposed a design in which at each timepoint, the question with the largest amount of uncertainty
in its correct answer will be assigned to an arbitrary worker. As a result, the same question might
be assigned to multiple workers. In this case, the expertise of individual workers governs the quality
of their responses from which an integrated response can be derived for the question. The lower the
expertise of each worker, the more responses are needed to generate an integrated response for the
question. In their following work [152, 153], the authors addressed heterogeneous worker expertise.
In this case, the entropy of the probability estimates from Eq. 1 embodies the uncertainty about
the true answer. The question with the highest entropy was selected for assignment at each time.
The payment for each worker is proportional to their current expertise estimates. The lower the
expertise, the less payment a worker will receive for a response.
In [151], the authors modelled the uncertainty of the correct response lj for question j as the
squared Euclidean distance between 0.5, denoting a random response, and the correct response
prediction from a binary classifier. The classifier is based on a logistic function which has global
coefficients including an intercept term, and receives inputs which are the observed features of the
question (i.e. xj in Eq. 6). At each time point, a question with the greatest uncertainty (i.e. the
6The minimum number of responses equals the minimum degree for the question nodes multiplied by the number
of questions.
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minimum squared Euclidean distance) is selected for assignment. Each worker is also represented
by a logistic function with worker-specific coefficients (i.e. wi in Eq. 6). The selected question is
then assigned to worker i who is able to maximize the probability of seeing the response rij :
P (rij |wi,xj) = δ(wi,xj)1{rij=lj}
(
1− δ(wi,xj)
)1{rij 6=lj}
(9)
where δ(wi,xj) = δij defined by Eq. 6.
In [154], the question assignment strategies were further extended to be based on two-coin
models which encode biases of individual crowd-workers towards positive and negative responses.
They also devised an adaptive decision boundary for determining the true answer of each question
and further, degrees of the uncertainty when class imbalance exists in the true answers. In [157], a
hidden Markov model was proposed to capture the correlation in the time-varying ability of each
crowd-worker. At each time step, the workers were ranked based on estimates of their current
abilities and only the top worker was assigned the question to answer. Compared to the above
work, this work fails to utilize all the crowdsourcing power available.
9. Modelling Worker Motivation, Question Difficulty and Contexts
In Section 7, the response quality is modelled to be dependent on the worker motivation under
different worker contexts. The heterogeneity in question difficulty was ignored in order to simplify
both the derivation of theoretical equilibrium guarantees and the practical design of the gamification
techniques. When heterogeneity in question difficulty is considered, the above problems become
more complicated since the response quality becomes harder to measure and estimate.
According to the literature, both the payment-based and the gamification-based incentive mech-
anisms have successfully controlled the response quality by considering the question difficulty. In
this case, the payment-based mechanisms are typically applied to the response-level context while
the gamification-based mechanisms are applied to the session-level context.
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Figure 12: A taxonomy of QCC papers that considered worker motivation, context and question difficulty. These
papers focused on designing either monetary payment mechanisms which additionally modelled question difficulty
or gamification mechanisms which increase question difficulty to challenge workers.
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9.1. Monetary Payment in Response-Level Contexts
Only recently have payment-based incentive mechanisms started to consider the heterogeneity
in question difficulty to refine their design of the response-level payment functions. They do this
by increasing the payment for responses whose quality is low due to the fact that the difficulty of
the questions is high rather than a lack of effort from the workers.
In the machine-aided peer prediction mechanism proposed in [121], the difficulty of a binary-
response question is encoded by a dedicated probability distribution over its correct answers. If
this distribution is (nearly) uniform a priori or a posteriori, it means the question is so difficult that
its correct answer remains uncertain. In this case, the payment function was designed to achieve a
truth-telling equilibrium for each question with respect to their correct answer distributions.
In [158], the proposed peer prediction mechanism was also applied to binary-response questions
except that it relies solely on human peer consistency assessment. The difficulty of a question is
captured by a symmetric matrix of joint probabilities of each pair of response options (including
each option with itself). Each entry represents the chance that any random pair of workers agree
or disagree with one another on the correct answer for the question. The larger the summation of
the diagonal entries is, the easier the question and it is the opposite for the off-diagonal entries.
The payment function takes in a matrix of posterior joint probabilities given responses thus far to
a question and rewards a random pair of workers according to the joint probabilities indexed by
their responses to the question. The paper provided synthetic experiment results suggesting that
by considering heterogeneity in question difficulty, the proposed mechanism achieved improved
incentives for workers to be truthful and was less sensitive to their collusions compared to the
previous mechanisms.
9.2. Gamification in Session-Level Contexts
The level mechanism is the most common game element that leverages differences in the difficulty
of the questions for motivating the crowd-workers. The mechanism sets up different difficulty levels
for the questions so that the workers progress from the easiest level to the hardest level to finish
a task. In this case, proceeding to a higher level that contains more difficult questions requires
the workers to exert more effort and show higher levels of expertise. In [128], in addition to the
scoring mechanism, the level mechanism controls the timing of when to change the difficulty levels
of the medical documents used for fact elicitation for each worker according to the estimate of their
current expertise. The mechanism was appreciated by the workers with 50% of them praising the
level progression.
The level mechanism has played a similar role in [140, 132] where higher worker scores trigger
higher difficulty levels in the game for the workers to play. In [139], variants of the level mechanism
were proposed, namely the mission mechanism and the challenge mechanism, to inspire crowd-
workers to learn and develop new image editing skills and meanwhile complete the editing tasks
posted by the requesters, which requires utilizing the skills they have learned. The mission mech-
anism issues increasingly difficult sets of questions packaged in the form of increasingly advanced
training sessions for workers to improve their skills. Once a worker has successfully completed a
session, she can proceed to a more sophisticated one. The challenge mechanism lists all of the image
editing tasks from the requesters with difficulty levels matching the current skill level of the worker.
10. Modelling Worker Ability, Question Difficulty and Contexts
A crowd-worker’s ability can vary across different contexts in which this worker has been situ-
ated. For example, the ability can be dynamic across different tasks the worker has participated,
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or across different pages of the same task. There are statistical models that have considered the
interactions among the worker ability, question difficulty and worker context. These models incor-
porate latent factors that represent different levels of contexts along with the worker ability and
question difficulty factors.
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Figure 13: A taxonomy of QCC papers that considered worker ability, context and question difficulty. They focused
on statistical modelling of how worker ability varies with contexts at specific levels, and the interaction between the
context-aware ability and the difficulty.
10.1. Modelling the Interactions in Task-Level Contexts
In this case, the context in which the interaction between the worker ability and the question
difficulty takes place is the whole crowdsourcing platform. The proposed models utilize the response
information from the same workers across various source tasks in which they have participated to
improve the parameter estimation for a target task. This is referred as the transfer learning [167]
in the Machine Learning literature.
In [159], the authors proposed a model which encoded multi-dimensional ability and difficulty.
Since this multifaceted model has a larger number of parameters, it is intrinsically more vulnerable
to response sparsity. The authors thus decided to transfer worker expertise estimates from source
tasks to target tasks based on estimated similarity between the tasks. This cross-task transfer was
able to smooth out the unreliable expertise estimation in the target tasks. However, no transfer
learning was conducted for calibrating the estimation of question difficulty in the target tasks. In
contrast, in [160, 161], the transfer learning helps to learn a better latent feature representation for
each question in the target task from the observed features of the questions in the source tasks. The
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latent feature representation for each target question can be interpreted as their multi-dimensional
difficulty.
10.2. Modelling the Interactions in Session-Level Contexts
The literature has also considered the effect that each session/page has on the interaction be-
tween worker ability and question difficulty. The corresponding models learn latent (bias) variables
specific to particular (types of) sessions. Zhuang and Young [162] did this by learning a factor
graph model which encoded biases in workers’ responses to questions within each session. The
factor function is defined as the exponent of a linear regression over counts of different response op-
tions (within a particular session). The regression coefficients are global, meaning that they encode
a latent bias structure shared across the sessions. This latent structure maps the response count
distribution from a session to a bias value which offsets each response accuracy (determined by
the expertise-difficulty interaction) within that session. In another work [163], the authors assume
that a worker annotates a data item within a session either independently from the other items
or relatively according to a ranking of the items’ response correctness probabilities (determined by
their difficulty). The ranking is inferred using the Plackett-Luce model [168]. The top-N items in
the inferred ranking are considered to be the ones that are responded correctly. The parameter N,
which is smaller than or equal to the number of questions within a session, is estimated using the
ML estimation.
In [164], a worker drop-out modelling framework was proposed which consists of a sequence of
logistic survival models each corresponding to a particular session/page. Each model determines
the probabilities of workers surviving a particular session and moving to the next. The coefficients
of a model map features about workers (e.g. average response time, response accuracy over control
questions, etc.), questions (e.g. difficulty, skip rate, average response time, etc.) and consecutive
pairs of questions (e.g. same topic or not, their average skip rate, etc.) within the session. Similarly,
Mao et al. [165] endeavoured to predict the survival rates of the workers in their respective sequences
of sessions using session-specific classification models such as logistic regression and decision trees.
The side information features used by these models included the worker’s dwell time on a page, the
entropy of her responses from past sessions, the number of past sessions, the average response time
for past sessions, etc.
10.3. Modelling the Interactions in Response-Level Contexts
We now consider how features that describe the context under which each response is made,
such as response duration, order and location, can be used to improve the estimation of response
quality. In [33], the response time was aggregated in a Bayesian manner across the responses to
each question to obtain the lower and upper bounds of an acceptable response duration for each
question. The inferred bounds not only indicate the difficulty of the questions (i.e. higher upper
bounds suggesting more difficult questions), but also help detect spam responses (i.e. abnormally
long or short response time compared to the bounds). In [166], the quality of a worker’s response
to a spatial question (e.g. labelling point of interests) is jointly determined by three factors: the
worker’s intrinsic ability (i.e. the probability of her being reliable7), her (response-specific) location-
aware ability, and the difficulty of the question. The location-aware ability decays as the worker’s
7An unreliable worker randomly responds to questions and thus has a correctness probability on binary responses
of 0.5.
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response location moves farther away from the question. The question’s difficulty increases as its
distance from the worker becomes larger. Shared by both the workers and the questions, the decay
factor is treated as one of the model parameters over a finite set of ordinal values and estimated
during the model inference.
11. Modelling Worker Expertise, Question Difficulty and Response Relationships
Response Correlations
Response Correctness
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Figure 14: A diagram shows how worker expertise, question difficulty and response semantic relationships contribute
to the correlations within responses.
When semantic relationships between response options are present in crowdsourcing, QCC meth-
ods measure the relationships using some distance metric such that options with closer relationships
have smaller distances. A common distance metric used by the state-of-the-art methods is the length
of (or equivalently, the number of edges in) the shortest path between two options in a semantic
structure (e.g WordNet8).
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L-BFGS
[37]
Modelling Biases
Using Pre-Computed
Response Similarities
from External Knowledge
WordNet
EM-Based MAP
Estimation
[35]
Observed Fea-
tures about Re-
sponse Options
EM-Based ML
Estimation
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Figure 15: A taxonomy of QCC papers that considered worker expertise, question difficulty and semantic relationships
between responses. These papers focused on statistical modelling which leveraged pre-computed response similarities
from external knowledge to account for response biases.
Three papers have considered leveraging semantic relationships between response options [35,
36, 37] for improving the quality control of crowdsourced responses. In [35], a model was proposed
in which the probability of each response option a worker could give to an item is conditioned on its
8https://wordnet.princeton.edu/
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true answer and provided by a soft-max function. This function takes in the normalized distances
between each response option and the correct response, along with the question difficulty and the
worker expertise. The difference between the difficulty and the expertise is scaled by the normalized
distance before computing the corresponding conditional probabilities. Due to the scaling effect,
the log-odds of the probabilities are inversely proportional to the normalized distances. The larger
the distances are, the smaller the probabilities. In other words, a response option that is inherently
less related to the correct answer is less likely to be selected irrespective of the worker or question.
In [36], the authors proposed a model which shares the same idea as [35] except that similarity
scores between response options are pre-computed as the inverse of the Euclidean distances between
the options in terms of their observed features. Both of these models rely on the availability of the
external knowledge about the semantic relationships to pre-compute the semantic distances.
Recently, Yuan et al. [37] proposed the first QCC model that directly infers the semantic relation-
ships from responses. Their model captures the relationships using a symmetric latent relatedness
matrix. In this matrix, each off-diagonal entry is a real-valued score representing how related the
response options are to one another. The authors also observed two phenomena: (i) capable workers
are more likely to select options that are more (semantically) related to the correct answer and (ii)
difficult questions are more likely to receive responses less related to their correct answers. The
proposed model captures the above phenomena using ordinal logistic regressions. Each regression
has a response-specific slope being the expertise-difficulty difference, and the off-diagonal related-
ness scores as the ordinal intercepts specific to each option (other than the correct answer). The
authors also showed that their model can elegantly incorporate the external knowledge, via a linear
regression, into the prior mean of the Normal distribution which generates the off-diagonal scores.
They finally showed that their model outperformed the previous two models [35, 36] in true answer
prediction.
12. Summary and Discussion
Crowdsourcing has become a principle tool that allows research communities and companies
to collect data for (machine learning) system development and business analysis, with significant
cost savings and fast turnaround. However, cost-effective crowdsourcing is often elusive in terms
of the quality of recorded responses (and their costs). The corresponding solution is the quality
control methods which aim to remove or suppress low-quality responses (and possibly amplify the
high-quality ones).
The two major categories of quality control methods are quality control mechanism designs and
statistical inference models. Surveys exist regarding each category but their reviews were isolated
without recognizing the strong connection between the categories. We view the quality control
for crowdsourcing as a unified cyclic process that integrates both categories of methods (as show
in Fig. 1). This viewpoint allows us to conduct a more comprehensive survey that bridges the
two categories in terms of how their methods work together for crowdsourcing. To link these two
categories, we proposed in the survey a framework that systematically unifies all the crowdsourcing
aspects (and their important attributes) modelled by both categories to determine the response
quality. Many of these aspects and attributes are, for the first time, identified from the quality
control literature. Based on this framework, we proposed another graph framework that unifies the
past quality control research in terms of the aspects and attributes they have exploited.
Our survey flows by following the (quality control research) graph framework and provides
systematic technical insights to a wide variety of quality control methods. It also contributes, for
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the first time, organized taxonomies of quality control papers. Each taxonomy is characterized by
the considered aspects and attributes, modelling assumptions, parameter estimation techniques,
and design features of quality control methods of the same type (deemed by the graph).
According to our survey, there are several limitations existing in the current quality control
research. First, even though the GLAD and DS models have been widely applied and extended
in the research, these applications and extensions rarely aim at large-scale sparse and diverse
crowdsourcing. This type of crowdsourcing is featured by large numbers of questions and crowd-
workers with sparse responses across them, and the characteristics of questions vary greatly (e.g.
by having diverse topics). It is prevalent in user content generation Websites where the quality of
user generated content poses an issue and needs to be controlled (by estimation from responses of
other users to the same content).
In this case, workers can react very differently due to the question diversity, and their response
correlations will be much weaker than small-scale (non-sparse and non-diverse) crowdsourcing which
is the focus of current quality control statistical models. As for the future research directions,
Bayesian hierarchical models have great opportunities to properly handle large-scale sparse and
diverse crowdsourcing due to its hierarhical nature that smooths the parameter estimation. Among
them, hierarchical topical models that have been successfully applied to mining large corpora with
diverse topics and sparse word counts [169] can be adapted. Deep generative models [170] are
another alternative to this purpose. They can be adapted to capture complex question and worker
behavioural diversity directly from responses.
The second limitation is the lack of advanced statistical models for handling the subjectivity that
might exist in crowdsourcing. Human judgment and generated content is intrinsically subjective
due to personal preferences and opinions. This leads to the variation in responses (to the generated
content) and current quality control methods seldom separate it from the quality of responses in
their models. Although recent work [101, 31] has made some progress in this regard, more need to be
done in the future. Especially, how to design measures of subjectivity in crowdsourcing remains an
open question. So far, only Yuan et al. [31] directly defined a question-specific subjectivity measure,
which was the expected number of correct answers (for a question) with respect to underlying groups
of workers. Each group embodies a particular school of thought. Other subjectivity measures can
be defined specific to not only questions but also the entire tasks or individual workers. The
corresponding statistical models can encode (and quantify) these measures as variables different
from the response quality variables.
Another interesting direction is to investigate the dependency between the difficulty and subjec-
tivity of questions. According to the literature, the difficulty determines the response quality while
the subjectivity results in response correlations. Yuan et al. [31] made an independence assumption
about the two attributes. Future study on this subject will allow us to derive more reasonable
models if the dependency does exist. More importantly, these subjectivity-aware models can be
further fused with those aiming for large-scale sparse and diverse crowdsourcing as user generated
contents can exhibit subjectivity. Controlling the quality of these contents requires models that
separate out the subjectivity.
The third limitation is the incapability of current quality control methods in handling either
highly multi-class or highly multi-label crowdsourcing. The former concerns crowdsourcing with
many response options but there is only a single correct answer for each question. Examples
include image categorization based on large numbers of ImageNet categories [41], Web-page catego-
rization based on large numbers of Wikipedia (topical) categories, and etc. The latter concerns each
question having many different correct answers (from many response options). A typical example
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is using crowdsourcing to tag user generated contents [171]. Both types of crowdsourcing could
exhibit response correlations resulted from semantic relationships between the response options.
Highly multi-label crowdsourcing is also a special case of partially subjective crowdsourcing which
means that the subjectivity could also have contributed to the response correlation. However, the
dependency between the subjectivity and the semantic relationships remains unclear and needs to
investigated in the future.
Currently, only three papers have dealt with the quality control for highly multi-class crowd-
sourcing [35, 36, 37] and only one of them shows the potential of reconstructing the semantic
relationships directly from responses [37]. As for the highly multi-label crowdsourcing, an effective
quality control model is still missing. According to the literature, semantic relationships between
response options can be represented by an option-option matrix. This matrix is quadratic in the
number of options, and therefore will become very large when the number of options is large. Thus,
when estimating this matrix (to reconstruct the semantic relationships), future models need to
make use of matrix factorization techniques. Such techniques are useful for lowering the complexity
of the models to prevent over-fitting. The resulting factors for individual options can be modelled
to interact with other factors (e.g. the expertise and difficulty factors) to determine the response
quality.
The final limitation we have found regards the quality control mechanism designs, particularly
for the worker payment and the task gamification. For the payment design, most of the current
techniques rely on game-theoretic approaches. These approaches are theoretically elegant and
sound but very few empirical studies have been conducted to systematically verify and compare
their quality control performance in practice. Thus, studies in this regard are needed in the near
future. As for the gamification design, its methodologies are much less developed compared with
the methodologies for either worker payment or question allocation design. We have found from
our survey that most papers on gamifying crowdsourcing tasks rely on either authors’ impressions
about various game elements or conventions from video games to draw the designs for their tasks.
This suggests the need for empirical insights into both the individual and joint effects of the various
game elements on the quality of responses in general crowdsourcing. These insights will be critical
for constructing a common gamification methodology which provides empirically justified guidelines
on what combinations of game elements should be used (possibly together with other mechanisms)
to improve the quality of responses.
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